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ANTITRUST LAW
Joseph E. Conley, Jr.*
Antitrust developments this year continued the pace of past years,
with interpretation of procedural requirements again dominating the
field. In significant developments, the courts further refined the re-
quirements of standing to bring suit and immunity for governmental
action. In addition, the Supreme Court reaffirmed its per se approach
to maximum price fixing, and the Justice Department announced its
long awaited revision of guidelines for the enforcement of merger
policy.
STANDING
Discharged Employees
Section 4 of the Clayton Act provides that "[amny person who shall
be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefor."' Two courts of appeals
and several federal district courts considered whether this section con-
fers standing to sue on an employee who is discharged for his refusal
to cooperate in his employer's antitrust violation.
Although a person's interest in his employment may be classified
as "property" for some purposes,2 the language of section 4 has not
been read literally.' Further, under traditional doctrine, an employee
has no antitrust claim if his employment is terminated incidental to
an antitrust violation directed principally at some other target, as long
as the employee's job is not itself a "business,"" such as a commis-
sioned salesman with his own territory.5 The theoretical foundation
for this position is that although the plaintiff is in fact injured by
an act in furtherance of the employer's antitrust violation, the
employee's injury is not caused by a destruction of competition in
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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1. 15 U.S.C. S 15 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
2. See, e.g., J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
495-96 (1978). Despite some of the authority discussed in this section, the word "prop-
erty" can be construed broadly under the antitrust statutes. See Blue Shield of Va.
v. McCready, 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982), discussed at notes 25-36 infra, and accompanying
text.
3. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST S 247, at 770 (1977).
4. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 160(c) (3d ed. 1981).
5. Dailey v. Quality School Plan, Inc., 380 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1967).
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a particular market; i.e., it is not an antitrust injury, although it may
be actionable under some other theory.6
The cases decided this year involve refinements on these concepts
and application of Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,' the
Supreme Court's leading case on the question of "antitrust injury."
In that case, Brunswick unlawfully acquired bowling alleys which com-
peted with the plaintiff's business and the plaintiff alleged that but
for the acquisitions, the acquired bowling alleys would have failed and
he would have profited by an increase in business. The Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff did not suffer "antitrust injury," because the
antitrust laws seek to compensate for injury caused by a damage to
competition and the plaintiff's particular injury resulted from the
preservation of competing bowling alleys.
The first case raising the question this year in the context of a
discharged employee was Ostrofe v. H.S. Crocker Co..' The plaintiff
was the marketing director of H.S. Crocker Company, Inc., which, ac-
cording to the allegations of the plaintiff's complaint, was engaged
in a conspiracy with other manufacturers of paper lithograph labels
to fix prices, rig bids, and allocate customers and territories. The con-
spiracy apparently was effectuated by Ostrofe's action on behalf of
his employer, and when he refused to cooperate in the conspiracy and
was threatened with the loss of financial benefits and further promo-
tion, he resigned and was unable to obtain other employment in the
label industry.
The district court dismissed Ostrofe's amended complaint on the
ground that the agreement to fix prices, the antitrust violation alleged,
was directed not at him, but at other "targets," and that any
effect on the plaintiff was merely incidental.' This was an application
6. For example, the plaintiff may state a claim for relief on a theory of "wrongful
discharge." See generally Note, Employment At Will-Limitations on Employers' Freedom
to Terminate, 35 LA. L. REV. 710 (1975).
7. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
8. 670 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1982).
9. Two incidental issues disposed of by the court involved the requirement of
an agreement under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), and the plain-
tiff's allegation of a group boycott of his services by all members of the price-fixing
conspiracy. The agreement requirement was apparently satisfied by reliance on Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), in which the Supreme Court, in an alternative holding,
suggested that the joint action requirement may be satisfied by the conduct of the
plaintiff and the defendant, where the plaintiff initially cooperates in an anticompetitive
practice and then withdraws. Whatever the merits of such a theory, see Albrecht, 390
U.S. at 161 (Harlan, J., dissenting), it would not seem to be available here since Ostrofe
was a member of the same corporate enterprise and thus incapable of conspiring with
his employer. See P. AREEDA, supra note 4, 1 334. The other issue, the plaintiff's allega-
tion of a boycott of his services by Crocker and other members of the conspiracy,
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of the "target area" standing test, by which only those within the
area of the ecomomy affected by a breakdown of competitive condi-
tions may sue under section 4 of the Clayton Act."0 Ostrofe's amended
complaint alleged only a conspiracy directed at the "product market"
of his employer; i.e., the market for sales of paper labels. Thus he
was not within the class of persons protected by the antitrust rule
violated by such a conspiracy, namely, purchasers of paper labels,"
even though that conspiracy was furthered by Ostrofe's discharge.
The Ninth Circuit resolved this question by "balancing [the] com-
peting policy interests, principally the interest in effective enforce-
ment of the antitrust laws against the interest in avoiding vexatious
litigation and excessive liability."" The court held that, on balance,
the policy favoring vigorous enforcement of the antitrust laws called
for granting standing to the employee in this case. The overwhelm-
ing factor counselling for this result was that the underlying antitrust
violation, price fixing, is of a type that frequently goes undetected
by its intended victims," at least without the cooperation of insiders;
in the absence of an effective federal remedy for such discharged
employees, the court believed such cooperation would not be
forthcoming.' The Ninth Circuit was especially motivated by the
absence of any universal state remedy for wrongful discharge in such
circumstances."
Moreover, in the court's view, the considerations normally calling
for a limited standing rule-unlimited liability and controlling the
potential class of plaintiffs-did not outweigh the interests in pro-
was found to have stated a claim under section 1, since on the pleadings at least,
the defendant's actions were directed at restricting competition in the market for such
services.
10. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW 334 (1978).
11. Again, this must be contrasted with Ostrofe's original complaint alleging a
group boycott designed to eliminate competition in his employment market. See note
9, supra. See also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 338c.
12. 670 F.2d at 1383. Avoiding "vexatious litigation and excessive liability" are
two of the principal reasons for restricting standing to certain classes of plaintiffs.
See 2 P. AREEDA, & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 333.
13. Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809, 847 n.172 (1977), cited in 670 F.2d at 1384 n.10.
14. 670 F.2d at 1384.
15. For example, the court cited Phillips v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 651
F.2d 1051 (5th Cir. 1981) (considering Georgia & Texas law), wherein the court denied
a claim for relief for wrongful discharge of an employee terminated for giving truthful
deposition testimony in antitrust litigation. Interestingly, California, which apparently
would have supplied the applicable law in such an action by Ostrofe, see RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS S 196 (1969), does provide a remedy for wrongful
discharge. Nevertheless, the court believed effective enforcement of the federal an-
titrust statutes required a uniform federal remedy.
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moting antitrust enforcement. Employees are readily identifiable, and
their discharge should be easily traceable to a refusal to cooperate
in an antitrust offense."6 Also, although incidental to a primary pur-
pose of limiting competition in a separate product (as opposed to the
market for the employee's services), the employee in such cases is
an intended victim of the employer's efforts to further his antitrust
violation. This is obviously a different case than an employee who
loses his job because the antitrust offense is successful in raising prices
and restricting output, thus causing layoffs from less-than-capacity
operations."
Reading Brunswick broadly to deny standing to anyone not in-
jured by a destruction of competion in the market in which such plain-
tiff buys or sells goods or services would have defeated Ostrofe's
claim. 8 The Ostrofe court interpreted Brunswick very narrowly,
however, to deny standing only to a plaintiff complaining of the preser-
vation of competition, the very result the antitrust statutes are in-
tended to achieve. So read, Brunswick would seem to seldom apply,
since the peculiar facts are unlikely to recur, 9 and the standing doc-
trine articulated in Ostrofe is thus very broad, creating a claim for
relief under the federal antitrust statutes whenever an employee is
discharged in furtherance of an antitrust violation.
In contrast to the Ninth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit, in Bichan
v. Chemetron Corp. ,2 took a more traditional position on this question
when presented with facts similar to Ostrofe. In Bichan a salaried ex-
ecutive was fired for violating an apparently informal industry rule
against soliciting the customers of competitors. The Seventh Circuit
had earlier adopted the "target area" test for limiting standing in
antitrust cases," under which it would be necessary for a plaintiff
to prove that he was within an area of the economy threatened by
a breakdown of competitive conditions by reason of the antitrust
violation." Since the plaintiffs injury did not flow from the threat
to competition in the industrial gas industry, his claim was dismissed
for a lack of standing.
16. 670 F.2d at 1385, nn.15-17.
17. See 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 10, 1 338e.
18. 670 F.2d at 1387.
19. See the criticism of the court of appeals' decision in Brunswick in Areeda,
Antitrust Violations without Damage Recoveries, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1127, 1132 n.34, on
the ground that if the merger therein involved "saved" companies that would other-
wise have failed it would not have been illegal in the first place because of the "fail-
ing company" defense.
20. 51 U.S.L.W. 2017 (7th Cir. June 25, 1982).
21. Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co., 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978).
22. See note 10, supra and accompanying text.
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In reaching this result, the Seventh Circuit criticized the Ninth
Circuit's decision in Ostrofe as misinterpreting the Supreme Court's
teaching in Brunswick, which the Seventh Circuit read as requiring
more than a casual relationship with the antitrust violation. An in-
jury flowing directly from the antitrust offense will be necessary in
the Seventh Circuit to achieve standing and, presumably, an immediate
injury caused by some act merely in furtherance of the antitrust viola-
tion will be insufficient. The Seventh Circuit found the interest in
avoiding excessive antitrust litigation to outweigh the Ninth Circuit's
concern for an additional enforcement tool.
Obviously, the Supreme Court's decision in Brunswick does not
control this precise issue. Since the injuries in that case resulted from
the preservation of competition, the Court was correct in holding that
there were losses "which are of no concern to the antitrust laws."'"
But this is not the case with an employee who is discharged in fur-
therance of an antitrust conspiracy, although not technically within
the group threatened by a breakdown of competition. In this respect,
the court in Bichan goes too far in interpreting Brunswick. The cases,
however, do identify correctly the two competing policies, and the
issue will ultimately have to be considered by the Supreme Court."
Indirect Purchasers
Some light was shed on the problem discussed above when the
Supreme Court decided a related standing issue late in the court's
term. In Blue Shield of Virginia v. McCready,25 the plaintiff was a
subscriber to a Blue Shield plan that reimbursed her for the expenses
of psychologists only if the expenses were supervised and billed
through physicians. The plaintiff had been refused reimbursement
under the plan for treatment by a psychologist, and she alleged that
Blue Shield's refusal to reimburse her was in furtherance of a con-
spiracy between Blue Shield and a society of neuropsychiatrists to
boycott psychologists and exclude them from the market for
psychotherapy services.
The District Court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that
23. Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
24. Four district courts have also considered the issue this year, with the trend
favoring the Bichan position. See McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 655 (E.D. Pa.
1982); Callahan v. Scott Paper Co., 541 F. Supp. 550 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Perry v. Hartz
Mountain Corp., 537 F. Supp. 1387 (S.D. Ind. 1982). Only Shaw v. Russell Trucking
Line, Inc., 542 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982), sided with the Ninth Circuit. Because
of the division within the Third Circuit created by the three Pennsylvania cases, supra,
it is likely that the Third Circuit will render an opinion on the question soon, making
a grant of certiorari by the Supreme Court even more likely.
25. 102 S. Ct. 2540 (1982).
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if a conspiracy existed, it was directed only at the competing
psychologists and that as an indirect purchaser of these services, the
plaintiff lacked standing since she was not "within the sector of the
economy competitively endangered by the defendants' alleged viola-
tions of the antitrust laws."2 McCready thus raised, on slightly dif-
ferent facts, the issue presented in the Ostrofe and Bichan cases."z
In an opinion which bears directly on the resolution of the "discharged
employee" cases, the Court read section 4 of the Clayton Act broad-
ly, in deference to Congress's "expansive remedial purpose,"2 at-
tributing to Congress a desire "to create a private enforcement
mechanism that would deter violators and deprive them of the fruits
of their illegal actions.""8 Further, the Court wrote: "The Act is com-
;prehensive in its terms and coverage, protecting all who are made
victims of the forbidden practices by whomever they may be
perpetrated.""
In implementing this policy, the Court rejected two limitations
suggested by the defendants in McCready. The first was the rule an-
nounced in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois1 that indirect purchasers may
not sue for injuries sustained when their injuries have been passed-
on by intermediate sellers who were injured directly. The purpose
of this rule, as indicated in Hanover Shoe v. United States Shoe
Machinery,2 was to prevent double recovery, since the passing-on to
the indirect purchaser did not bar an action by the passing-on in-
termediate seller. The Court, in McCready, held that the policy of Il-
linois Brick did not bar suit in this case by the indirect purchaser
since she had paid the provider of services, thus eliminating the
possibility of double recovery. 3 The second argument of the defen-
dant rejected by the Court was that the plaintiff's injury was too
remote to be cognizable under the antitrust statutes, since the con-
26. Id. at 2544 (quoting from Record at 17).
27. The facts are slightly different, however, in that the plaintiffs injuries in
McCready flowed directly from the conspiracy, since the sole manner in which the
direct market, the psychologists, would be injured would be through denying reim-
bursement to the plaintiff's class. In Ostrofe and Bichan the injury was caused by
a separate act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
28. 102 S. Ct. at 2545.
29. Id.
30. Id. (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219 (1948)).
31. 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
32. Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
33. However, this analysis ignores one central theme of Illinois Brick-the direct
purchasers as a group are "most likely to press their claims with the vigor that the
S 4 treble-damages remedy was intended to promote." McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2546.
It also seems to ignore at least the policy of Hanover that allows recovery by an in-
termediate party even if damages are passed on.
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spiracy was directed primarily at the psychologists and not their pa-
tients. In rejecting this argument, the Court again painted with a
broad brush in language which portends some difficulty for standing
tests which restrict the class of plaintiffs:
Denying reimbursement to subscribers for the cost of treatment
was the very means by which it is alleged that Blue Shield sought
to achieve its illegal ends. The harm to McCready and her class
was clearly foreseeable; indeed, it was a necessary step in effect-
ing the ends of the illegal conspiracy. Where the injury alleged
is so integral an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there can be
no question but that the loss was precisely "the type of loss that
the claimed violations .. .would be likely to cause." 4
Finally, in language particularly relevant to the employee standing
cases, the Court wrote that respondent McCready "seeks to recover
as damages the sums lost to her as the consequence of Blue Shield's
attempt to pursue that scheme."3 The Court agreed with petitioners
"that the relationship between the claimed injury and that which is
unlawful in the defendant's conduct, as analyzed in Brunswick, is one
factor to be considered in determining the redressability of a par-
ticular form of injury under S 4.""
The Court's opinion in McCready is important for at least two
reasons. First, it casts considerable confusion on the Hanover-Illinois
Brick problem by suggesting that an indirect purchaser may bring
an action when his seller's injury is passed through to him and that
in these circumstances, the passing on will bar an action by the direct-
ly injured seller who passes on the injury." Second, it suggests a broad
interpretation of section 4 of the Clayton Act, which may sustain
employee standing in cases such as Ostrofe and Bichan. The dissenters
suggest as much by their reading of the majority opinion to allow
an action by persons who suffer economic loss "as a necessary step
in effecting a conspiracy to place third parties at a competitive
disadvantage."3 This clearly would cover an employee discharged in
furtherance of a conspiracy directed toward a separate "target group,"
because it promotes Clayton section 4 as "a private enforcement
mechanism,"39 the precise theory on which the Ninth Circuit relied
in Ostrofe.
34. McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2549 (quoting Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat,
Inc., 429 U.S. at 489).
35. McCready, 102 S. Ct. at 2551.
36. Id. at 2551 n.19.
37. See the apparent suggestion to this effect in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Rehnquist. Id. at 2555 n.8.
38. Id. at 2553 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
39. Id. at 2545.
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Assignment of Antitrust Claims
The standing issue also was addressed by the Fifth Circuit in Mar-
tin v. Morgan Drive Away, Inc.4" in another context-the validity of
assignments of federal antitrust claims. In this case, a corporation
assigned its antitrust claim to one of its shareholders as a partial pay-
ment for his underlying agreement to purchase all of the shares of
stock of the other shareholders. On review of a motion to dismiss
on the ground that the individual was not the proper party in
interest,4 the Fifth Circuit affirmed its own rule that federal antitrust
claims are assignable as a preliminary matter42 and held that the form
of the assignment, i.e., whether it is champertous, must be judged
by the law of the state where the assignment was executed and was
to be performed-in this case, Louisiana. The Court held that Loui-
siana Civil Code article 2447 does not prevent the assignment to one
not an officer of the court. Thus, although the assignment in this case
was under suspicious circumstances, i.e., to a purchaser who was to
use the proceeds of the claim as part payment of the purchase price,
the assignment was valid in both form and substance.
IMMUNITIES AND EXEMPTIONS
State Action
As usual, most of the work in the antitrust field during the past
year involved the several exemptions and immunities from the statute,
as the courts continued to define the outer limits of these barriers
to liability. The "state action" exemption, first articulated in Parker
v. Brown,43 exempts the action of state governments from liability
under the antitrust statutes, but apparently does not immunize private
conduct where the state has delegated certain regulatory authority
to a private group" or where the state has permitted certain private
conduct in an area regulated by the state"5 but has not compelled the
private conduct.
The extent of the availability of state action immunity for local
governments remains in some doubt. In City of Lafayette v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co.," the Supreme Court held that a local government
is immune only if its action is "directed or authorized" by the state
40. 665 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1982).
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
42. Jefferson County City Pharmaceutical Ass'n, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories, 656
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
43. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
44. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
45. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
46. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
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under a state policy to substitute regulation for competition." The
Court returned to that question again this year in Community Com-
munications Co. v. City of Boulder,48 in which the city of Boulder, Col-
orado, a "home-rule" city under the Colorado Constitution, refused
to allow expansion for three months by the city's existing cable televi-
sion licensee, while the city drafted a new ordinance and invited new
businesses to enter the market. The existing licensee filed suit under
section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging an illegal conspiracy, and the
city invoked the "state action" immunity of Parker v. Brown" in
defense.
In a 5 to 3 opinion, the Court held that state action immunity
is available only where it is action by the state itself or action by
a municipality in furtherance of a "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy."' In Boulder, although the action was not taken
by the state itself but by the Boulder city government, Boulder
nonetheless argued its action was in furtherance of the state policy
expressed by the Colorado Constitution's "guarantee of local
autonomy,"'" which ceded to the city of Boulder the power to imple-
ment the regulation challenged by the plaintiff. The Court disposed
of this argument by classifying Colorado's position on the particular
regulation as "one of mere neutrality,""2 since the state "allows its
municipalities to do as they please."53 In the future, state action im-
munity will require "an affirmative addressing of the subject by the
State."5'
The decision in Boulder continues the trend toward the limitation
of the Parker v. Brown immunity which has proceeded through
Goldfarb,55 Cantor, and Lafayette,7 and apart from the decision's nar-
row holding, it signals further to the lower courts that on novel "state
action" issues, the defense should be construed narrowly.
47. Id. at 414.
48. 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
49. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
50. 102 S. Ct. at 842.
51. Id. at 842.
52. Id. at 843 (emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. Id. For example, in Benson & Gold Chevrolet, Inc. v. Louisiana Motor Vehicle
Comm'n, 403 So. 2d 13 (La. 1981), a party challenged the action of the state agency
denying him a license to operate a car dealership. The Louisiana Supreme Court held
the action was protected by the state action exemption since the state legislature
"affirmatively addressed" this question of regulation in LA. R.S. 32:1253 (Supp. 1954),
which gives the agency the power to regulate dealerships.
55. 421 U.S. 773 (1975). See also text at note 44.
56. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). See also text at note 45.
57. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). See also text at note 46.
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In addition, Boulder creates a severe limitation, more so than
Lafayette, on the flexibility with which a state may order its own af-
fairs. The decision makes clear that, whereas a state acting individually
would be immune from antitrust liability, the delegation of the same
power to a local government through broad "home-rule" power" will
not result in protection from liability. This is precisely the fear ad-
vanced by the city of Boulder, which the Supreme Court dismissed
on the grounds that such delegation of power may still be made, but
simply cannot be exercised in an anticompetitive way.59 This may not
be as simple a matter as the majority assumed, however, for it may
not be easy for a city to determine that its conduct will not run afoul
of the federal antitrust statutes. Indeed, unless its conduct violates
one of the per se rules, a determination of liability under the "rule
of reason" would likely come only after a protracted trial and a
weighing of the economic evidence on both sides. 0 In addition, even
if liability were found, it would not be clear that the same remedies
imposed upon private parties would be available against a local
government."
Noerr-Pennington Doctrine
In North Carolina Electric Membership Corp. v. Carolina Power
& Light Co., 2 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected an at-
tempt by the defendants to turn the immunity of the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine' into a general privilege which would protect defendants from
discovery requests. The plaintiffs, electric cooperatives which were
unsuccessful in building their own generating plants or buying power
from sources other than the two defendant utility companies, filed
58. Even narrow subject matter delegation may not trigger immunity from an-
titrust liability, depending on the meaning of the Court's requirement that the state
itself must have addressed the subject. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 843.
59. Id. at 843-44.
60. Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion, id. at 845, suggests that the liabili-
ty issue would be a very difficult one, perhaps because a governmental defendant
presents different antitrust considerations than would normally be involved. See also
Posner, The Proper Relationship between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust
Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974) (suggesting a different kind of rule of reason analysis
where a governmental entity is a defendant).
61. The Court specifically avoided this question in City of Lafayette, 435 U.S. at
402 n.22 and accompanying text. See also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
I 217-17b (1978) (suggesting that only equitable remedies should be available against
a governmental defendant).
62. 666 F.2d 50 (4th Cir. 1981).
63. This doctrine, arising from Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961) and United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S.
657 (1965), protects, under the first amendment, concerted attempts to influence govern-
mental action.
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a Sherman Act section 1 action and requested "each document relating
to existing, contemplated or proposed state legislation affecting the
area in which an electric utility may market electric power and each
document relating to contemplated or proposed federal legislation
regulating the supply of electric power in bulk or power exchange
services."" The Fourth Circuit rejected the defendants' Noerr-
Pennington objection to the discovery request. on the grounds that
the Pennington Court itself conceded the admissibility of certain
evidence of legislative activity and only required a limiting instruc-
tion that such activity could not form the basis of antitrust liability.
Indeed, such evidence would be discoverable under Rule 26(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Further, in response to the argu-
ment that to allow discovery of such evidence would have a "chilling
effect" on the exercise of the defendant's first amendment rights, the
court cited Herbert v. Lando,"5 which allowed discovery of the editorial
judgment leading to the creation of a news story, and commented,
"If discovery into the internal affairs of a news organization does not
have a chilling effect, then neither would discovery in this case.""s
Religious Exemption
In an interesting case in the District of Columbia Circuit, Costello
Publishing Co. v. Rotelle,67 that court considered whether a general
religious exemption should be carved from the Sherman Act. The
defendants in the case were the National Conference of Catholic
Bishops and ten episcopal conferences that had joined forces to pro-
vide English translations from Latin liturgical texts following the ap-
proval by the Catholic Church of the use of native languages. When
three episcopal conferences became dissatisfied with the pace of this
project, they formed their own consortium to translate a certain Latin
work and began distributing it through Costello Publishing Co., the
plaintiff. The defendants then notified Catholic book dealers that the
plaintiff's product was not an approved translation and asked that
they not distribute it. This Sherman Act section 1 action followed.
Although the district court dismissed the complaint on the ground
that the religiously motivated conduct was protected from Sherman
Act liability by the first amendment, the court of appeals reversed,
holding that no "blanket" religious exemption existed. The court of
appeals remanded for a consideration of whether the boycott of the
unauthorized product was "legitimately geared to the Church's pro-
64. 666 F.2d at 51.
65. 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
66. 666 F.2d at 53.
67. 670 F.2d 1035 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
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tection of its liturgy rather than its survival in the marketplace of
religious books."" Even if the motivation was purely religious,
however, the court of appeals indicated that an antitrust violation
could be sustained "by weighing the costs to the national antitrust
policies against the needs of free religious exercise in this situation."'69
McCarran-Ferguson Act
The Supreme Court this year affirmed the decision of the Second
Circuit in Union Labor Life Insurance Co. v. Pireno,0 discussed in
last year's symposium.71 A peer review committee of chiropractors
which advised an insurance company of reasonable fees for
chiropractic services had sought an exemption from antitrust liability
under the McCarran-Ferguson Act."2 The Supreme Court, relying on
Group Life & Health Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.," held that to
qualify for the exemption, it was necessary that the practice com-
plained of be: (1) for the purpose of transferring or spreading the
policyholders' risk; (2) an integral part of the relationship between
the policyholder and the insurance company; and (3) limited to entities
within the insurance industry.
The Court found that none of these elements was met in Pireno.
First, the review of the fees charged was "logically and temporally"
unconnected with the function of risk-spreading. Second, the
policyholder was indifferent to the procedure by which it was deter-
mined that his fees were covered by his policy, as long as they were
in fact covered. Third, although the exemption can extend to entities
not technically within the insurance industry, the exemption in these
circumstances was not of the type that concerned Congress in pass-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Justices Rehnquist, Burger, and O'Connor dissented. They would
have held that the peer review committees function as claims ad-
justers, a critical function in the operation of an insurance plan. Fur-
ther, the committee considers the very question of whether a claim
is paid, a question of deep interest to the policyholder and thus part
of the relationship between the policyholder and the company."
68. Id. at 1049.
69. Id. at 1050
70. 102 S. Ct. 3002 (1982), affg Pireno v. New York State Chiropractic Ass'n, 650
F.2d 387 (2d Cir. 1981).
71. See Fontham, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Antitrust Law, 42 LA. L.
REV. 484, 499 (1982).
72. 15 U.S.C. SS 1011-15 (1976).
73. 440 U.S. 205 (1979).
74. 102 S. Ct. at 3013 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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In Proctor v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., a case
decided before the Supreme Court announced its decision in Pireno,
the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit found that
the exemption did apply. In Proctor the plaintiff complained of an
agreement by five automobile insurance companies to pay damage
claims based on an agreed "prevailing hourly labor rate" for repair
shop services. The court held this arrangement to be within the
business of insurance, reasoning that since a purely intra-industry
enterprise was involved, the agreement was more in the nature of
the "business of insurance" than an agreement between insurance com-
panies and outsiders, as in Royal Drug and Pireno. Although the facts
of Proctor appear slightly distinguishable from the Pireno facts," much
of the Proctor court's language is in direct conflict with the Supreme
Court's opinion on claims adjustment in Pireno. Further, the Supreme
Court expressly relied on Royal Drug, a case in which the Court con-
demned an agreement between an insurer and pharmacies to limit
the price for which drugs would be sold to policyholders. The only
possible distinction between the practices in Royal Drug and Proctor
is that in Royal Drug the insurance contract provided a fixed fee for
which a subscriber could fill a prescription; thus the insurer's
agreements with the pharmacies for fixing prices on the drugs pur-
chased had nothing to do with the benefits paid to a policyholder in
an individual case. In Proctor, however, the agreement to pay "prevail-
ing hourly labor wages" directly determined the insurance benefit
received by a policyholder. The agreement in Proctor had a more
direct impact on the process of claims adjustment than did the agree-
ment in Royal Drug, where the amount was predetermined.
In Pireno, arguably, the use of a peer review committee to deter-
mine the amount of compensation payable on a claim also had a direct
influence on the process of claims adjustment. The majority's only
response on this issue, however, was that the peer review committee
merely made recommendations that were not binding on the company.
After Pireno, the only possible permissible practice seems to be a
claims adjustment process which is binding on the company, rather
than simply advisory, and on this question, Proctor may survive a
challenge despite an apparent conflict with Pireno. However, a serious
uncertainty remains over the question of whether the process of claims
adjustment is within the "business of insurance" exception.
Discovery of Grand Jury Proceedings
Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that
75. 675 F.2d 308 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
76. Especially distinguishable is the intra-industry nature of the arrangement.
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proceedings before a federal grand jury, although generally to be
preserved in secrecy,77 may be disclosed "when so directed by a court
preliminarily to or in connection with a judicial proceeding."78 Civil
antitrust plaintiffs obviously are interested in obtaining information
disclosed to a grand jury in a related grand jury investigation of the
same antitrust conduct. In 1979, in the leading decision on the
availability of grand jury proceedings to civil plaintiffs, the Supreme
Court held that the petitioning plaintiff has the burden of
demonstrating the following: (1) the material is needed to avoid a possi-
ble injustice, (2) the need for disclosure outweighs the need for con-
tinued secrecy, and (3) the request is structured to cover only the
material so needed.79 In cases decided this year by the courts of ap-
peals, In re Grand Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc."8 and In re
State of Illinois Petition to Inspect and Copy Grand Jury Materials,"1
both now pending in the Supreme Court, several state attorneys
general attempted to avoid the difficult standard of rule 6(e) by rely-
ing on section 4F of the Clayton Act, added by the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Antitrust Improvements Acts of 1976, which provided that the United
States Attorney General, upon the request of a state attorney general,
"shall . . .make available to him, to the extent permitted by law,
investigative files or other materials which are or may be relevant
or material to the actual or potential cause of action."82 The theory
of the plaintiffs in these cases was that the Hart-Scott-Rodino direc-
tive was an exception to rule 6(e)'s requirement of a showing of "com-
pelling and particularized need." 3
The Second Circuit, in Cuisinarts, and the Seventh Circuit, in Il-
linois, held that the language of section 4F requiring the Attorney
General to turn over "investigative files or other materials" did not
include grand jury proceedings, which traditionally have been shrouded
in secrecy and that, even if grand jury material was included in the
definition, section 4F required the disclosure only "to the extent per-
mitted by law," which both circuits concluded incorporated the rule
6(e) requirement for a showing of need. These decisions are squarely
against the earlier decisions of the Fourth Circuit, in United States
77. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(2).
78. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(i).
79. Douglas Oil Co. of Cal. v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211 (1979).
80. 665 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1981), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Connecticut v.
Cuisinarts, Inc., 50 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. Feb. 17, 1982) (No. 81-1595).
81. 659 F.2d 800 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. granted sub nom. Illinois v. Abbott & Assocs.,
Inc., 102 S. Ct. 1708 (1982).
82. 15 U.S.C.A. S 15f (West Supp. 1982).
83. 665 F.2d at 28. The United States intervened in Cuisinarts in general support
of the states' position for disclosure without a showing of need. Id. at 28 n.2.
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v. Colonial Chevrolet Corp.," and the Ninth Circuit, in United States
v. B.F. Goodrich Co.8" These circuits have held that section 4F is a
general exception to the rule 6(e) requirement that was designed to
put teeth into the simultaneously granted power to the states to sue
under the antitrust laws in a parens patriae capacity for its citizens.
With its grant of certiorari in In re Illinois,' the Supreme Court should
resolve the conflict.
AGENCY-APPARENT AUTHORITY
In an important case of first impression, the Supreme Court held,
in American Society of Mechanical Engineers, Inc. v. Hydrolevel Corp.,"
that a principal will be liable for the antitrust violations of its ap-
parent agent even where the agent acts purely in his own self in-
terest. The issue arose from the conduct of certain persons affiliated
with McDonnell & Miller, Inc. (M & M), a leader in the market for
low-water fuel cutoffs, who were also officers of a standard-setting
subcommittee of the nonprofit American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME).88 As a result of an inquiry initiated by M & M,
the ASME issued an opinion that a device placed on the market by
the plaintiff, Hydrolevel, one of M & M's principal competitors, was
unsafe. The ASME opinion was prepared principally by the ASME
subcommittee of which an M & M employee was the vice-chairman.
As a result, Hydrolevel alleged its market position was injured and
it ultimately won a jury verdict against the ASME on the theory that
it was responsible for the conduct of its apparent agents, the M &
M employees who designed the scheme to injure Hydrolevel.
The Supreme Court, over three dissents, adopted the common law
doctrine of apparent agency and rejected the arguments of the ASME
that liability should be predicated either on ratification by the ASME
or upon acts intended to benefit the ASME rather than the agent
itself: The Court held that the principal was responsible since the
agent's acts were effective because they were done with the prin-
cipal's economic force. The Court believed that such a rule would en-
courage the principal "to eliminate the anticompetitive practices of
all its agents acting with apparent authority, especially those who
use their positions in ASME solely for their own benefit or the benefit
of their employers."89
84. 629 F.2d 943 (4th Cir. 1980).
85. 619 F.2d 798 (9th Cir. 1980).
86. See note 80, supra.
87. 102 S. Ct. 1935 (1982).
88. Id. at 1939 n.2.
89. Id. at 1946.
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MAXIMUM PRICE FIXING
In the first case to raise the question in the Supreme Court since
the landmark decision in Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc.,9"
the Supreme Court refused an invitation to reverse the traditional
rule which prohibits agreements to set maximum prices." The theory
behind such a rule, although the practice is not as dangerous as
minimum price fixing,9" is that a maximum price often acts as a
minimum because it pegs the price at which competitors will sell. In
addition, a maximum price interferes with the freedom of retailers
to set their prices as they choose.93
In Sylvania, the Court approved the application of the "rule of
reason" to a scheme whereby a manufacturer restricted the territories
in which his distributors could sell, despite the "market restriction"
imposed from the top, because the system had the potential of pro-
moting "interbrand" competition even at the expense of some "in-
trabrand" competition. Although the Court in Sylvania expressly said
its opinion concerned only nonprice vertical restrictions,94 some com-
mentators thought the opinion left open a possible rule of reason
analysis for price restraints as well,95 at least for maximum prices. 6
The Supreme Court was asked to approve such a scheme in
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Society, 7 where two county
medical societies formed "fee-for-service" medical plans as an alter-
native to existing health insurance plans and set maximum fees which
could be charged by participating doctors to patients insured by the
plans. The state of Arizona sued under section 1 of the Sherman Act,
alleging an illegal agreement to fix prices, and moved for summary
judgement on the ground that such agreements are per se illegal and
cannot be saved by proof of any counterveiling competitive benefit.
Although unsuccessful in both the district court and the court of ap-
peals, the plaintiff was victorious in the Supreme Court. In a 4 to
3 opinion,9 the Court reaffirmed its earlier decisions" which held that
90. 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
91. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
92. See Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
93. Albrecht, 390 U.S. at 152-53.
94. 433 U.S. at 51 n.18.
95. See id. at 70 (White, J., concurring).
96. Indeed it has been argued that maximum price fixing should be encouraged
because it promotes consumer welfare. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U.
CHi. L. REV. 886 (1981).
97. 102 S. Ct. 2466 (1982).
98. Justices Blackmun and O'Connor did not participate.
99. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951);
Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1945).
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maximum price fixing must be judged by the same standards as
minimum price fixing; i.e., by the per se rule.
The dissenters would have remanded the case for a consideration
under the rule of reason of whether the scheme in the long run pro-
moted competition; for example, by giving consumers an additional
alternative to the existing health insurance plans. They suggested such
a plan should be given a price-fixing label only if it is a "naked
restrain[t] of trade with no purpose except stifling of competition."'0 0
The significance of the Maricopa case is that it is the first discus-
sion of price controls by the Supreme Court since the reemergence
of the rule of reason in Sylvania. The Court's decision may be sound
on traditional principles since even though maximum prices do set
a ceiling for consumers, where the agreement is purely horziontal it
frequently will be motivated not by a desire to improve output and
thus promote consumer welfare, but merely to advance the interest
of the competitors. Significantly, the Court did not address directly
the difference between horizontal price fixing and vertical price
restraints, which are much more defensible on the ground that they
reflect the decision by one who has the greatest interest in increas-
ing output, the manufacturer.' The Court's refusal to rest its analysis
on these differences does not bode well for vertical price restraints
which were thought to have a chance after Sylvania. But, since
Maricopa is a decision by a minority of the full Court" 2 and since
three members of the Court were willing to judge even horizontal
maximum prices under the rule of reason, vertical price restraints
may still have their day.' 3
MERGERS
The most significant development in the merger field in the past
year, probably the last decade, was the issuance by the Department
of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission of new merger
guidelines'" to replace those issued in 1968. The 1968 guidelines relied
100. 102 S. Ct. at 2482 (Powell, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. v. Topco Assocs., Inc.,
405 U.S. 596, 608 (1972), which was quoting White Motor Co. v. U.S., 372 U.S. 253,
263 (1963).
101. See Easterbrook, supra note 96, at 890 n.20.
102. See note 97, supra.
103. Assistant Attorney General William Baxter called the Court's descision in
Maricopa "very, very stupid and unfortunately so," and said the Justice Department,
through its exercise of prosecutorial discretion, would refuse to attack vertical ar-
rangements which set maximum prices. Wall St. J., Sept. 10, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
104. Justice Department Unveils Long-Awaited Revisions to Merger Guidelines; FTC
Issues Statement on Mergers, [Jan.-June] 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No.
1069, at 1251 (June 17, 1982) (with special supp.).
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on a four-firm concentration ratio as a measure of highly concentrated
markets and generally called for a government challenge to mergers
where the top four firms accounted for 75 percent or more of a market
and the merger added as little as a one percent share of the market
to a firm with as little as 15 percent.0 5 In a less concentrated market,
mergers between larger firms were permitted, but the guidelines were
still very strict,' reflecting the Supreme Court's very strict inter-
pretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act"1 in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States,' 8 which suggested that a post-merger firm of five percent in
even a "fragmented" market might be illegal.' 0
The new guidelines reflect a new sophistication in merger policy
and, at least in government enforcement, a more permissive approach
to the interpretation of section 7 of the Clayton Act. The new
guidelines adopt the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), which takes
the size of all firms in a market into account in measuring concentra-
tion, rather than the top four only, or even the top eight firms, as
did the old guidelines." ° The HHI assigns an index to a market by
adding together the squares of the market share of each firm in the
industry."' In this manner, even smaller firms in an industry affect
the concentration index, unlike the old guidelines. The difference bet-
ween the before and after index represents the increase in concen-
tration in the industry. For example, in an industry with ten firms,
each possessing 10 percent of the market, a merger of two firms would
increase the industry's index 200 points."' The increase in an industry's
index caused by a merger would determine whether the Justice
Department would file suit under section 7.
The Justice Department's guidelines suggest that in an industry
with a post-merger index below 1000 points, challenges to any merger
105. See P. AREEDA, supra note 4, 664.
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C.A. S 18 (West Supp. 1982): "No person ... shall acquire . . . the
stock or ... assets of one or more persons ... where ... the effect of such acquisition
... may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly."
108. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
109. In fact, in Brown Shoe the combined firm controlled as much as 57 percent
of some local markets, but the definition of those markets seemed to ignore the factor
of supply substitutability now addressed in the new guidelines. Thus, the markets
in Brown Shoe were probably improperly defined.
110. P. AREEDA, supra note 4, 664, at 978.
111. An industry with ten firms, each possessing a 10 percent share of the market,
would have an index of 1000: 10 squared or 100, added ten times.
112. Before the merger the two firms contributed a total of 200 points to the total
index (10 squared added to 10 squared). After the merger the two firms are one, which
contributes 400 points to the index, a combined market share of 20 percent squared (400).
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would be unlikely."' In a market with a post-merger concentration
index of between 1000 and 1800 points, the Department will challenge
mergers only if the merger increases the index by at least 100 points." '
In such a "moderately concentrated" market, an increase of 100 points
would "more likely than not" be challenged by the Justice Depart-
ment, depending on other factors, such as entry barriers. In a "highly
concentrated market," one with a post-merger index of 1800 points
or more, the Justice Department would challenge the merger if it add-
ed more than 100 points to the index, would "more likely than not"
challenge an increase of 50 to 100 points, and "would not likely"
challenge an increase of less than 50 points. Finally, the Department
says it will challenge any merger between a firm with 35 percent
of the industry market share and any other firm with as little as one
percent market share, unless there is one other dominant firm in the
market."'
In addition to the percentage guidelines, the Justice Department
will place increased emphasis on substitutability of both supply and
demand in defining the relevant market"6 and give apparently greater
latitude to vertical and conglomerate mergers, challenging them only
if they have significant horizontal effects. " 7
Since the Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission
have dual enforcement responsibilities under the Clayton Act,"8 the
F.T.C.'s simultaneous review of its own merger policy was also signifi-
cant this year. In response to the Justice Department's guidelines,
the F.T.C. announced that it would give "considerable weight" to the
Justice Department's view of horizontal mergers,"9 but reserved the
right to consider nonmarket share factors. Chief among these would
be considerations of efficiency, allowing some mergers that would be
condemned by the Justice Department because increases in market
shares of the merged firms may achieve economies of scale.2 Second,
113. See generally 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-6. The pur-
pose of the guidelines is "to indicate regions of safe harbors where management can
plan without having to worry about whether the Antitrust Division will pop out of
the closet." Statement of Assistant Attorney General William Baxter, id. No. 1252.
114. One easy method of calculating the increase is to multiply the premerger market
shares of the merger partners and double this figure. This will approximate the con-
centration index derived by the longer method. See notes 111 & 112, supra.
115. A dominant firm is classified as one at least half the size of the largest firm.
42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-7.
116. Id. at S-3-6.
117. Id. S-8-11.
118. See 15 U.S.C. SS 21 & 25 (1976).
119. 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-12.
120. The Justice Department indicated it would not normally consider this factor
because with higher thresholds to challenge mergers, such efficiencies will already
have been achieved by the separate firms before merger. Id. at S-11.
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the F.T.C. indicated its willingness to give consideration to the "fail-
ing company" defense"2 ' beyond its technical requirements. The Justice
Department, however, indicated that it would construe the defense
strictly.'22 Finally, the F.T.C. will give greater weight to firms which,
although small and thus perhaps not significant under an HHI analysis,
are potential threats to the power of larger firms in a market and
thus have a disciplining influence.'
Although it is too early to tell what impact these new approaches
will have in the long run, they have been applied in a couple of signifi-
cant tender offer battles during the past year. The first of these was
the offer by the Stroh Brewery Co. to buy the Jos. Schlitz Brewing
Co. Stroh's was the seventh largest national brewer, with a market
share of approximately 5 percent, and Schlitz was third, with 7.8 per-
cent, in a market classified by the Justice Department as "barely...
highly concentrated."'24 Thus, under the guidelines, this merger would
more likely than not be challenged if it added 50 to 100 points to the
industry's HHI.'2' The Stroh-Schlitz merger added approximately 75
points to the beer industry's index. 2 ' Although this merger would be
subject to challenge under the guidelines, the potential for the post-
merger firmsto challenge the industry leaders, Anheuser-Busch Co. and
Miller Brewing Co., apparently tipped the balance in favor of not
challenging the merger.'28 Under the old guidelines, of course, this
merger would undoubtedly have been challenged. 9
In contrast, in late July the F.T.C. initiated a challenge to a pro-
posed takeover of Cities Service Co. by Gulf Oil Corp., the nation's
sixth largest oil company, which would have moved up to number five
after the merger. 3 ' Although Gulf had a significant market share in
a market considered sensitive by the F.T.C., the retail gasoline market
in the South and along the East Coast, it is not clear that the market
would be considered highly concentrated by the Justice Department,
121. See Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969).
122. Compare 42 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) No. 1069, at S-11 with id. at
5 15.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 377 U.S. 271 (1964).*
124. Taylor, U.S. Conditionally Permits Stroh to Buy Schlitz, Signaling New Merger
Guidelines, Wall St. J., Apr. 19, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
125. See text at notes 113-115, supra.
126. By the short form calculation, 5 times 7.8 percent doubled would be 78 points.
See note 114, supra.
127. Anheuser-Busch Co. and Miller Brewing Co. together account for more than
half of the industry sales. Garino, Ingrassia, Lancaster & Petzinger, Growth of Anheuser-
Busch, Miller Puts Squeeze on Smaller Brewers, Wall St. J., Jan. 5, 1982, 2, at 33, col. 3.
128. Taylor, supra note 124.
129. See P. AREEDA, supra note 4, 664, at 978.
130. Wall St. J., July 29, 1982, at 32, col. 2.
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and since Cities Service ranked only 19th nationally, it is unlikely
that the merger would have significantly increased the industry's in-
dex. But, the merger would have given Gulf the power to control
capacity of Colonial Pipeline, the major transporter of petroleum pro-
ducts along the East Coast, and this apparently tipped the F.T.C.'s
hand against the merger. 31
The significance of both recent takeover cases, apart from perhaps
signaling a tougher approach by the F.T.C., is to demonstrate that
particularly in this area, the use of numerical cut offs will remain
guidelines only. Thus, despite the attempt to create "safe harbors"
and to facilitate planning, more subjective considerations will continue
to form merger policy at both the Justice Department and the F.T.C.
ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
A host of cases were decided this year under section 2 of the
Clayton Act, the Robinson-Patman Act;"2 two Fifth Circuit decisions
were significant.
In a case of first impression in the Fifth Circuit, the court ad-
dressed the question of whether under Robinson-Patman Act section
2(e), delivery is a "service" which must be provided to all purchasers
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Section 2(e) of the Act prohibits a seller
from discriminating "in favor of one purchaser against another pur-
chaser .. .of a commodity bought for resale ...by contracting to
furnish or furnishing ... any services or facilities connected with the
processing, handling, sale, or offering for sale of such commodity so
purchased upon terms not accorded to all purchasers on proportional-
ly equal terms."" 3 In L & L Oil Co. v. Murphy Oil Corp.,3 ' the buyer
claimed his seller violated section 2(e) by requiring the plaintiff to
take delivery of diesel fuel in trucks rather than in barges as offered
to other purchasers.1 5
The leading decision holding that a delivery is a "service" within
the definition of 2(e) is the Seventh Circuit's Centex-Winston Corp.
v. Edward Hines Lumber Co.,"3 which held that a seller illegally
discriminated by consistently delivering lumber behind schedule to
131. Id.
132. 15 U.S.C. S 13(e) (1976).
133. Id.
134. 674 F.2d 1113 (5th Cir. 1982).
135. The significance of this discrimination was that the trucks held up to 8,000
gallons of fuel while the barges carried 100,000 to 350,000 gallons. Thus, if the plain-
tiff wanted to resell by barges, it had to store the fuel delivered by the seller until
it accumulated barge capacity. Id. at 1116 n.4.
136. 447 F.2d 585 (7th Cir. 1971).
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one purchaser while delivering on time to others. The court found
the requirement that the services rendered must be in connection with
the resale of the product by the buyer"3 7 was satisfied because lumber
delivered late to the plaintiff would delay resale. The theory of the
court's opinion on the delivery issue was that 2(e) prohibits any kind
of "special favors. '"134
The overwhelming weight of judicial opinion and commentary,
however, has been contrary to the Seventh Circuit's position."9 The
argument against the Centex-Winston approach is that the language
"services or facility" refers essentially to advertising or promotional
functions, which directly facilitate resale of the product by the favored
purchaser.
In approving the dismissal of the plaintiffs 2(e) claim, the Fifth
Circuit joined the ranks of those courts which have held that the defini-
tion of "services" must be so limited. In addition, the court held that
even if the delivery in this case could be classified as a service, it
would be a violation of 2(e) only if it were directly related to the resale
of the product by the purchasers. ' ° To meet this test, the court held
the original seller "must become active in the resale of the product..'.'.
Since the court considered the delivery to be concerned only with
the original sale and only indirectly related to the resale, it held 2(e)
was not violated on this ground.
The Fifth Circuit also held during the past year that the Robinson-
Patman Act does not apply where the discriminating sales are made
to hospitals operated by agencies of the state government. In Jeffer-
son County Pharmaceutical Association, Inc. v. Abbott Laboratories,'2
the court affirmed, in a per curiam opinion, the opinion of the district
court which held that the Robinson-Patman Act was never intended
to regulate sales to governmental agencies. The district court rested
its conclusion on the strong legislative history of the Act and the fact
that the Robinson-Patman Act has a more restricted scope than the
137. Skinner v. United States Steel Corp., 233 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1956). In this case
the court held that providing credit to the buyer was not within the scope of 2(e)
because it was not in connection with resale and because the language "services or
facilities" contemplated merchandising services.
138. 447 F.2d at 587, cited in Murphy Oil, 674 F.2d at 1117.
139. See Purdy Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Champion Home Builders Co., 594 F.2d 1313
(9th Cir. 1979); David R. McGeorge Car Co. v. Leyland Motor Sales, Inc., 504 F.2d
52 (4th Cir. 1974); Cecil Corley Motor Co. v. General Motors Corp., 380 F. Supp. 819
(M.D. Tenn. 1974). See generally W. PATMAN, COMPLETE GUIDE TO THE ROBINSON-PATMAN
ACT 129-34 (1963); F. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT
365-76 (1962).
140. Murphy Oil, 674 F.2d at 1119 (citing Skinner, 233 F.2d at 765).
141. 674 F.2d at 1119.
142. 656 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. granted, 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
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Sherman Act. It thus distinguished the Supreme Court's opinions in
Abbott Laboratories v. Portland Retail Druggists Association, Inc.,
which imposed liability on "non-profit" hospitals not operated by state
agencies, and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.," which
refused to protect a political subdivision of the state from liability
under the Sherman Act on the Parker v. Brown state action
exemption. ' The Supreme Court has granted certiorari. '48
DAMAGES - TYING ARRANGEMENTS
In an important case involving the damages recoverable for an
illegal tying arrangement, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals con-
tinued the approach discussed in last year's symposium 4 of requir-
ing proof of actual damages to support a claim under the Clayton Act.
In Kypta v. McDonald's Corp., 8 the court rejected the damage for-
mulation for tying cases accepted in the leading case of Siegel v.
Chicken Delight, Inc.,49 in which a franchisee was given permission
to use the franchisor's name free of charge but was required to buy
supplies and materials from the franchisor at a price slightly above
the prevailing market price for similar items. The plaintiff in Siegel
requested damages in the amount of the difference between what he
paid for these items and what they could have been purchased for
in the market. The court approved this measure of damages, reject-
ing the defendant's argument that the real value of the franchisor's
name should have been deducted from the preliminary damage calcula-
tion; i.e., the plaintiff should have recovered only the excess over the
market value of both the defendant's name and its supplies.
A similar claim was present in Kypta, where the plaintiff was
granted a McDonald's franchise for $10,000 but was also required to
execute a lease of premises owned by McDonald's at 7 percent of month-
ly gross sales. When the plaintiff was denied a second franchise,
he sued McDonald's claiming an illegal tie between the grant of
McDonald's name and the lease of its premises. As damages, he sought
the difference between the rent paid to McDonald's and the rent he
claimed he would have paid at an alternative site.1 51
143. 425 U.S. 1 (1976).
144. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
145. See discussion at notes 42-60, supra, and accompanying text.
146. 102 S. Ct. 1629 (1982).
147. Fontham, supra note 71, at 484-88.
148. 671 F.2d 1282 (11th Cir. 1982).
149. 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971).
150. All of this of course assumes that the franchise and the lease constituted
separate products. On that question, see Principe v. McDonald's Corp., 631 F.2d 303
(4th Cir. 1980), where the court held these were a single product. See Fontham, supra
note 71, at 512.
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The Eleventh Circuit rejected the plaintiff's claim. Since there
was no evidence of the real value to the plaintiff of the McDonald's
franchise given to the plaintiff for $10,000, it was not proven that
"the entire package was noncompetitive.""' Citing United States Steel
Corp. v. Fortner Enterprises, Inc.,"' the court held that a plaintiff
complaining of an illegal tie suffers damages only if the price paid
for the two products together is more than the price he would have
paid if the two products had been offered for sale separately. Thus
if a defendant has some economic power in the market for the tying
product," 3 the defendant will be able to allocate the purchase price
for the two products in any manner he sees fit. The significance of
this approach is that very few tying arrangements will result in
damage to a purchaser of the tied product, since in the garden vari-
ety tying cases, the plaintiff will pay only the total price which could
have been extracted by the products separately.'54 This is precisely
the fear expressed by the court in Siegel."'
STATE ANTITRUST LAW
In two decisions this year, the Fifth Circuit interpreted two signifi-
cant state statutes which promote antitrust enforcement, the prohibi-
tion on noncompetition clauses,"' and the conspiracy requirement of
Louisiana's "little Sherman Act." 157
The noncompetition clause arose in Commonwealth Life Insurance
Co. v. Neal."' An employer in Louisiana is prohibited from requiring
as a condition of employment that the employee promise not to enter
a competing business upon the termination of employment. 159 In Neal,
the precise question was whether an agreement by an employee-agent
of an insurance company not to solicit the customers of the company
151. Kypta, 671 F.2d at 1286.
152. 429 U.S. 610 (1977) (Fortner II).
153. A defendant must have some economic power in the tying product for a tying
case to be proven in the first place. See Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States
Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (Fortner I).
154. This is the monopoly price extractable for the tying product alone. See P.
AREEDA, supra note 4, 530.
155. 448 F.2d at 52 n.11. This result apparently would not prohibit damage actions
by competitors in the market of the tied product who have been injured by the defen-
dant's use of his leverage in the tying product's market to obtain a higher market
share in the market for the tied product.
156. LA. R.S. 23:921 (1950 & Supp. 1962).
157. LA. R.S. 51:122 (1950).
158. 669 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1982).
159. LA. R.S. 23:921. The statute contains an exemption permitting such agreements
for two years following the termination of employment where the employer incurs
an expense in training the employee or advertising the business.
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upon termination of employment was within the scope of the statute.
Although the issue had not been addressed directly by the Louisiana
Supreme Court,' the Fifth Circuit found that two of the three state
courts of appeal that had addressed the question decided it in favor
of the employee 61 and interpreted the supreme court's attitude about
the statute as generally promoting competition." 2 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit stated that the statute must be given its broadest possible
reading and held that although the employee in Neal was not pro-
hibited from competing totally, the nonsolicitation provision of his
employment contract was unenforceable under the statute.
In the second case, Dussouy v. Gulf Coast Investment Corp.,"3 the
Fifth Circuit held a conspiracy could be proven under the state's "lit-
tle Sherman Act"'" by evidence that the corporate defendant conspired
with its own employees.' The decision is contrary to the prevailing
rule under the Sherman Act that requires something more than "in-
tracorporate" action." Thus, proving a conspiracy in restraint of trade
will be easier, at least on this issue, under the Louisiana statute than
under the federal act.'67
160. A decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court on the issue would be binding
on a federal court sitting in diversity. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
161. Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. Simpson, 370 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1979); National Motor Club of La., Inc. v. Conque, 173 So. 2d 238 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1965). Contra, Delta Fin. Co. of La. v. Graves, 180 So. 2d 85 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1965).
162. In Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Foti, 302 So. 2d 593 (La. 1974), the Louisiana
Supreme Court read the expenditure exception of the statute to require a "substan-
tial" expenditure.
163. 660 F.2d 594 (5th Cir. 1981).
164. LA. R.S. 51:122 prohibits a "conspiracy" in restraint of trade.
165. This affirmed the Louisiana rule first announced in Tooke & Reynolds v. Bastrop
Ice & Storage Co., 172 La. 781, 135 So. 239 (1931).
166. See P. AREEDA, supra note 4, 334, at 395-96 & n.56.
167. But see the opinion of the Supreme Court in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968), which seems to greatly facilitate proof of the conspiracy issue under the
Sherman Act.
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